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This paper examines how Medical Brain Drain (MBD) creates
incentives for the production of doctors in the sending country
(brain gain) and its effects on the health status of the local
population. Using Bharghava-Docquier dataset I find no relation
between MBD and rates of enrolment to medical schools in the
country of origin while there are incentives to pursue secondary
school in the sending country and tertiary education abroad. Finally
MBD induces an increase in the number of deaths due to
HIV/AIDS: a case-study reveals that MBD affects more the “quality”
of health services rather than their “quantity”. [JEL Classification:
O15, F22, I12, I21]
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1. - Introduction
According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006b)
4.3 million health workers need to be recruited globally and Sub-
Saharan Africa alone currently needs one million more in order
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possible mistake in this work.to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Filling this gap will
require scaling up investments to US$ 6 billion per year (CfA,
2005). Sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, has the lowest health
worker/population ratio, nine times smaller than that of OECD
countries (Table 1). Every year around 20,000 skilled health
workers leave the African continent (WHO, 2006b). Save the
Children (2006) reports that the brain drain of doctors has cost
Ghana almost US$ 75 million and saved the UK around US$ 137
million in training costs between 1998 and 2006. These figures
are to be coupled with the fact that the African continent suffers
24 per cent of the global burden of disease while disposing of less
than three percent of the world’s health workers and accounting
for less than one per cent of the global health expenditure (WHO,
2006b).
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TABLE 1 
PHYSICIANS’ AND NURSES’ DENSITY IN THE HOME COUNTRY











East Asia and Pacific 0.66 2.01 1.14%
East Europe and Central Asia 2,88 9.29 1.13%
Latin America and Caribbean 1.40 2.33 2.48%
MENA 1.43 2.70 5.88%
OECD 2.93 8.65 3.40%
South Asia 0.36 0.78 8.42%
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.16 1.30 19.04%
i Following BHARGHAVA A., DOCQUIER F. (2007) the regional rate of medical brain drain is:
,
where Mr,t is the stock of physicians from region r working abroad at time t and Pr,t the num-
ber of physicians working in the sending region r at time t as reported in WHO estimates
(2006a).












Source: BHARGHAVA A. - DOCQUIER F. (2006); WHO (2006a).These figures give a hint of the scale of the problem of the
shortage of health workers in Africa, a shortage for which the
emigration of skilled workers is generally blamed (together with
the HIV/AIDS pandemic). Although the brain drain has always
been seen as a “curse” to the sending countries at the benefit of
the receiving ones, in the most recent years the literature has
started to underline the existence of possible benefits for sending
countries associated to the migration of skilled workers: such
benefits would pass through four channels that are remittances,
incentives to education (i.e. brain gain), return migration and
networking between emigrated workers and the country of origin1.
The contrast between these interpretations and the classical
brain drain literature has fed a particularly vivid debate amongst
economists although empirical contributions on this issue to date
have been quite scarce because of a general lack of data and the
results of those that have been carried out remain controversial.
This debate is then the scientific background to the
widespread concern in the international community about the
shortage of physicians, nurses and pharmacists which has a major
impact on the health outcomes of a country, an issue that is at
the heart of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
This work aims at giving a contribution to the debate over
the effects of brain drain analyzing the relationship between
physicians’ emigration, schooling decisions and health outcomes,
in order to assess, whether and to what extent, the emigration of
physicians to more developed countries can create incentives on
those who remain to attain their studies in the field of medicine,
how this outflows affect the main health outcomes of the sending
country’s population and to what extent the results obtained in
Sub-Saharan Africa represent a special case.
This work will be structured as follows: section 2 provides a
brief outline of the current state of the economic literature on the
issues of brain drain from developing countries and on its effects
on the country of origin; section 3 introduces the data that have
been employed in the analysis and draws some pictures of the
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1 For an exhaustive review of these issues see ILO (2001).current status of the medical brain drain phenomenon; section 4
is then dedicated to the empirical analysis: a comparison between
the results obtained by Clemens (2007) and those obtained
employing Bharghava-Docqueir estimates (2007); an analysis of
the specificities of Sub-Saharan Africa’s medical brain drain with
respect to the rest of the world; the assessment of the existence
of a brain gain phenomenon looking at the effects of migration
on schooling decisions; and finally an analysis of the relationship
between medical brain drain, the health status of the population
in the sending country, its level of human development and the
quality of its educational system. In section 5 a case study on
Zimbabwe will provide evidence of some “hidden” effects of
medical brain drain. Section 6 concludes.
2. - Theoretical Background
As mentioned in the introduction this paper is meant to be
an empirical contribution to the debate on the effects of skilled
migration on the country of origin, which has been raised by the
so called new brain drain literature2. According to this view there
would be some potential benefits, other than remittances, return
migration and networking between emigrated workers and the
country of origin, entailed in the brain drain phenomenon. Indeed
the dynamics triggered by the emigration of skilled workers would
be as follows (Schiff, 2005):
i. The brain drain raises the expected returns to education;
ii. This induces additional investment in education (a “brain
gain”);
iii. Which may result in a “beneficial brain drain” or net brain
gain (i.e. a brain gain that is larger than the brain drain);
iv. A net brain gain raises welfare and growth.
Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998) for instance
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2 MOUNTFORD A. (1997); STARK O. et AL. (1997, 1998); STARK O. and WANG Y.
(2002); STARK O. (2004); BEINE M. et AL. (2001, 2003); DOCQUIER F. and RAPAPORT
H. (2004) and VIDAL J.P. (1998).argue that, under asymmetric information, the enlarged
opportunities and the associated different structure of incentives
due to the brain drain could give rise to a brain gain. Migration
by high-skill members of its workforce notwithstanding, the home
country would end up with a higher average level of human capital
per worker which would just make the country better off.
If many theoretical models have confirmed the existence of
such effects, the empirical analysis, though still scarce, has
reported much more ambiguous results. On the one hand Beine,
Docquier and Rapaport (2001) tested the brain gain hypothesis on
a small sample of countries3 finding a positive correlation between
schooling and migration. They confirmed their findings two years
later using a wider dataset (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998)
whose analysis led to the conclusion that emigration of tertiary
educated workers caused an increase in the total stock of tertiary
educated.
This result was then revised by Faini (2003) who, using the
same dataset, found that a positive probability of migration for
workers with tertiary education had a significant positive impact
on the rate of secondary school enrolment but a negative impact
on the rate of tertiary school enrolment. This conclusion was
interpreted as suggesting that prospective migrants may want to
strengthen their chances of admission to the host country by
pursuing their tertiary studies there. In this case, the brain gain
argument would not hold as the outflow of skilled workers would
more than offset the increase of secondary school graduates.
Eventually, Lucas (2005) contributed to this debate showing
that the brain drain actually had a significant negative impact on
the accumulation of human capital. He measured education in
terms of both tertiary enrolment and increase of tertiary education
at home and found that the emigration of skilled workers had a
negative impact on both variables and that this impact was not
only statistically significant but also substantial.
While the three contributions mentioned above have focussed
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3 Their sample is made of 37 countries amongst which only four are Sub-
Saharan countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.on the effects of brain drain on human capital accumulation at
the economy wide level, very few studies have investigated the
possibility of a beneficial brain drain in specific sectors. A sectorial
approach indeed could be useful to have an insight of the choices
induced not only as to the length and level of school attendance
but also regarding its professional specialization.
With regard to the health sector, several studies have been
published which were aimed at investigating the link between the
possibility of migration and the choice of becoming a doctor.
Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004) have studied the
implications of physicians’ migration by conducting a survey
among overseas doctors working in the UK; their findings suggest
that the links between migration possibilities and training choices
are very weak as very few respondents answered that the
possibility of migration had actually influenced their educational
decisions.
On the other hand, Clemens (2007) carefully investigated the
possibility of a positive brain gain in the health care sector from
both a theoretical and empirical point of view employing a dataset
(Clemens and Pettersson, 2006) that contained estimates of health
workers’ emigration from Africa to test the impact of these
outflows on the number of health professionals in the country, on
the main public health indicators and on the mass availability of
basic primary care. He finds that the emigration of physicians
from Africa has no impact on the stock of physicians left in the
source country hence suggesting that the prospect of migrating
would create incentives to become doctors and thus induce an
increase in the number of medical graduates which would offset
their outflow. Moreover Clemens finds no evidence of any
correlation between the number of doctors in the country and the
main health indicators both in terms of mortality ratios and in
terms of health care services provided, such a result would be due
to the fact that the principal causes of mass morbidity and
mortality among the poor in Africa are diseases that do not require
a skilled medical workforce to be embanked but just basic care
(e.g. oral re-hydration during diarrhoea) that can be provided by
less trained staff.
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was a systematic analysis of the relationship between medical
emigration and educational choices, a key point to assess the
existence and magnitude of a brain gain. The present work also
aims at further investigating the links between medical emigration
and health outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to evaluate
the impact of physicians’ emigration on the health status of the
population.
3. - Data Description
The main source for this analysis has been a new panel
dataset published by Docquier and Bhargava (2007) on medical
brain drain. This dataset provides estimates of the stocks of
physicians emigrated from 191 source countries to 16 OECD
destinations, as well as data on the number of physicians still
working in their home country. The dataset covers a time period
of 14 years with data having been collected from 1991 to 2004.
As far as the domestic stocks of physicians and nurses in the
country are concerned, the estimates are based on the statistics
compiled by the World Health Organization (2006a).
As shown in Table 1, Sub-Saharan African countries are, with
no doubt, the poorest ones in terms of physicians and nurses with
respect to the population. Indeed, the last fifteen countries in the
world in terms of physicians per 1,000 people in 2004 are all Sub-
Saharan countries, with values ranging between 0.011 and 0.047
physicians per 1,000 people, while the first fifteen are mainly
OECD countries which show values that range from 1.3 of Turkey
to 4.4 of Italy.
With regard to the number of physicians abroad, on the other
hand, the estimates are computed by Bharghava and Docquier on
the basis of the immigration data provided by the most important
OECD destination countries. The countries that have been surveyed
are Canada, United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Belgium, Denmark, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, Portugal, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Norway. The authors have
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qualification, i.e. the country in which they have attended medical
school; such data have been found for Canada, France, New
Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom and United States (73 percent
of the sample for 2004). In the case of Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, instead, migrants are defined on
the basis of their country of birth (18 percent of the sample), while
for Italy, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland on the basis of their
country of citizenship (9 percent of the sample).
These data reveal that the biggest recipients are the United
States and United Kingdom which respectively received 91,898
and 79,866 foreign physicians in 2004 (that is 32% and 28% of
the total emigration).
I finally coupled these estimates of migration flows with
indicators of health, education and wealth taken respectively from
WHO, UNESCO and IMF databases. The overall picture we get is
one of extreme inequalities, where Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits the
highest levels of (infant and maternal) mortality together with the
lowest levels of per capita GDP and health staff availability.
4. - Empirical Analysis and Main Findings
4.1 A Comparative Study on the Effects of Medical Brain Drain
The estimates employed by Clemens (2007) substantially differ
from those of the Bharghava-Docquier dataset I employed in that
they are built according to a different definition of an “African
doctor”: while Bharghava and Docquier define medical brain drain
as the emigration of workers «who have attained tertiary
education in the field of medical sciences in their country of
origin», Clemens and Pettersson build their dataset assuming that
an “African emigrant doctor” is «whoever, being born in an African
country, is currently employed as doctor in another country
outside Africa and has been residing there on a sufficiently
permanent basis circa 2000 to be included in that country’s most
recent census» (Clemens, 2007).
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country of birth certainly entails several problems in that it
includes people who may have become physicians after having
emigrated and hence may not have chosen this profession (or may
not have had the means to choose it) had they remained in their
country of origin. The definition of Bharghava and Docquier, on
the other hand, is more restrictive and may underestimate the
actual number of emigrated physicians. Still, it has an important
advantage with respect to that employed by Clemens and
Pettersson as the latter does not allow us to evaluate the “fiscal
costs” of brain drain: the vast majority of African doctors who
have been trained in their country of origin have been trained
with public funds, thus their departure represents for the local
government a major net fiscal loss, which is to be added to the
costs of replacing the departed staff.
In conclusion the two methods can both be employed if
interested in evaluating the loss of human capital from the sending
country while only the one based on the country of training can
be used to evaluate the loss of public financial resources. Another
key difference between the two datasets is the number of
destination countries included: Bharghava and Docquier include
sixteen destination countries as a proxy of the whole world while
Clemens only nine. Nevertheless the outflows estimated by
Clemens are much more copious because of the less restrictive
definition employed.
Despite these methodological differences, once we compare
the data of the two datasets for year 2000 and restrict the sample
to Sub-Saharan countries only, we find that the correlation
between the number of physicians abroad in the two datasets is
quite high (0.8251) as shown in Graph 1.
Following the study conducted by Clemens (2007) and limiting
the scope of my analysis to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
(whereas Clemens takes into account Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia as well), I tested the relationship between
the flow of emigrated doctors and the number of doctors left in
the home country following the hypothesis that the prospect of
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returns to the “investment” of attaining tertiary education in
medical sciences. The underlying idea is that there is a two
equation system in which:
i. the potential for high returns for migration induces more
people to undertake training, in this case for medical school;
ii. some of those people remain in the home country (either
because they change their desires or are unable to migrate) so
that it is possible that high returns overseas generate not only
immigration but also a larger stock of doctors in the home
country.
The relation between the stock at home and the stock overseas
can thus be expressed in a reduced form as follows:
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GRAPH 1
PHYSICIANS ABROAD PER 1,000 POPULATION
ACCORDING TO THE TWO DEFINITIONS
Source: BHARGHAVA A. - DOCQUIER F. (2006) and CLEMENS M. - PETTERSSON G. (2006).(1)
where l ^
i is the stock of health workers per thousand people in the
sending country, and l’
i is the number of physicians who have left
the sending country per thousand people4, according to the two
different definitions of African doctor that we are now comparing.
Following Clemens (2007), we suppose, by the way, that we
observe only l*
i which is the stock of health workers we count in
the receiving country at a certain year. This assumption is
plausible as we do not take into account all the destination
countries but only a limited sample (nine in Clemens and sixteen
in Bhargava and Docquier), and as it might happen that not all
those who were doctors are still working as such. We consider,
thus, that l’
i is a function of l*
i and of some country specific
constant ci such that l’
i = cil*
i. This implies that when running OLS
regressions we risk getting biased estimations of β, because l*
i is
correlated, by definition, to the error term of the regression. Hence
we will include in the regression some variables so as to control
for factors that are likely to influence both l*
i and ci and then seek
some instrumental variables that are likely to influence l*
i but
should not have any effect directly on l ^
i.
In order to maintain the comparison with Clemens’ analysis
I include the same control variables that can simultaneously affect
the number of doctors abroad and the number of those left in the
home country: the country’s wealth, measured in terms of per
capita GDP; its political stability, measured through a dummy
variable that detects the involvement of the country in at least one
conflict since 1970; and, finally, the grade of literacy of the
population measured in terms of primary enrolment rate.
I run the regressions for both datasets, as I now exclude from
the analysis conducted by Clemens North African countries. The
results are shown in Table 2: Model 1 is a basic OLS regression on
the complete sample of countries, while Model 2 restricts the sample
     ll ii i
  =+ + αβ ε
'
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4 The number of doctors will always be related to the population of the sending
country.to the 31 countries for which all the data are available. In Model
3 I include control variables and finally, in Model 4, I run Two Stage
Least Squares Regressions; for each regression I show on the left
hand side the results obtained using the variables of Clemens-
Patterson (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and on the right those obtained
using Bharghava-Docquier dataset (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8).
The OLS regressions in Table 2, together with Graph 2, show
that, when we employ, as independent variable, the number of
physicians that emigrated after having been trained in their home
country, rather then the number of doctors that were born in one
of the sending countries of the sample and then emigrated, the
effect on the stock of physicians left in the country of origin is
smaller in size, though still positive and significant. This finding
somehow weakens the brain gain hypothesis because, if the
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TABLE 2
MEDICAL BRAIN GAIN IN AFRICA:
A COMPARISON OF TWO DATASETS
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N 46 46 31 31 31 31 31 31
Adjusted R2 0.4782 0.3094 0.5090 0.4261 0.7264 0.7008 0.7235 0.6953
Sargan Test, p-value 0.9497 0.4211
For all tables: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
ii First Stage Regressors are: Francophone, ln land area, ln physicians’ wages in host country, ln GDP/cap
in host country, ln primary enrolment rate, conflict since 1970.prospect of emigrating was to increase the incentives to become
doctors, these incentives should be stronger if those who emigrate
were already doctors at the time of departure. In this case, indeed,
the advantages of becoming doctors would be more visible to those
in the home country, than if the migrant had become a doctor
after having emigrated.
In order to eliminate any possible endogeneity of the
explanatory variable I instrument it with the following variables
that are likely to influence the emigration stock of physicians and
only through this the dependent variable “physicians per 1,000
people”: a dummy variable for Francophone sending countries, the
land area of the country of origin and the average level of
physicians’ salaries and of per capita GDP in the destination
countries (both weighted for the inflows of physicians received by
each destination country).
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GRAPH 2
THE EFFECT OF PHYSICIANS ABROAD ON DOMESTIC STOCKS
OF PHYSICIANS: COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO DATASETS
Source: BHARGHAVA A. - DOCQUIER F. (2006) e CLEMENS M. - PETTERSSON G. (2006).The validity of these instruments is widely documented in the
literature (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2006, or Clemens, 2007):
linguistic and colonial ties are likely to favour emigration flows
but there is no reason to expect an African French speaking
student to be more likely to become a doctor than a non French
speaking one if not for the prospect of emigrating. With regard to
the level of GDP and of physicians’ wages in the destination
countries, these are meant to be proxies for the level of
attractiveness of destination countries, thus we expect them to be
positively correlated with physicians’ emigration, while there is no
reason to expect any direct relationship with the local stock of
physicians. Finally, with regard to the country size, the validity of
the instrument is more questionable: on the one hand we may
imagine that a person might choose not to work as a physician
in a place with few goods and services that complement his
profession (i.e. a small country), but this is an effect that acts
solely through migration and thus the instrument would
undoubtedly be valid. On the other hand, we can imagine that a
person born in a small country is less likely to become a doctor
than someone living in a bigger one5.
The results of these Two Stage Least Squares show that, once
we include instrumental variables that influence the number of
physicians abroad, its effect on the stock of physicians in the home
country becomes less significant passing from 1% (columns 1, 3,
5) to 5% level of significance (column 7) in the case of data by
country of birth, and from 1% (columns 2, 4, 6) to not significant
(column 8), in the case of data by country of training. This
confirms that the explanatory variable “ln physicians abroad per
1,000 people” is highly endogenous.
As far as the controls are concerned we find that the effect of
the level of income per capita in the sending country is always
positive and significant, thus suggesting that the richer the country
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5 For instance because the small country may lack a medical school. For this
reason, from section 4.3, I will include among the instruments population density
and the share of population living in urban areas as proxies for the cost of
acquiring education (e.g. the higher population density and the share of urban
population, the lower the distance to school). In this section, instead, I maintain
the set of instruments employed by Clemens to keep the parallel with his analysis.the more the individuals will be able to attend tertiary education
and in particular, medical studies. Moreover, the result of First Stage
Regressions for which doctors tend to leave richer African countries
more than poorer ones confirms the widespread idea that, in the
poorest countries, and there alone, economic development seems to
encourage, rather than discourage, emigration by helping potential
emigrants to overcome fixed costs associated with departing and
settling overseas. Hence, the effect of per capita GDP is positive and
significant on both the stock of physicians abroad and in the home
country: the richer the country, the more doctors there will be and
the more will leave it. To explain this result we can suppose that
when an economy starts growing, there is an immediate increase
in human capital due to an increase in individual wealth and to a
widespread desire of faster social mobility, a desire that not
everyone manages to achieve. Nevertheless such abundant offer of
skilled work does not meet an adequate demand, that is the country
is not able to absorb this workforce yet and the skilled workers have
no choice but to emigrate6.
The most important result we get, by the way, is that once
we include all the control variables both for the dependent variable
“physicians per 1,000 people” and for the variable “physicians
abroad per 1,000 people” in the first stage regressions, the effect
of migration on the domestic stock of physicians disappears and
becomes not significant inducing us to reject the “brain gain”
hypothesis suggested by Clemens (2007)7.
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6 With regard to the instrumental variables, instead, we only find the expected
negative correlation between the area of the sending country and the emigration
flows. Still this result only holds for Clemens’ estimates. We underline, on the other
hand, that neither the level of per capita GDP abroad, nor the level of wages of
physicians in the destination country play any significant role in boosting
emigration. This result might be seen as the reflection of the huge gap existing
between sending and destination countries with regard to these two variables, thus
a marginal increase in their values would not be a significant incentive to emigrate.
The occurrence of an armed conflict since 1970 is also not significant: this result
was quite predictable as the vast majority of countries did experience a conflict
so the variable does not display much variation among the countries of the sample.
7 The p-values of the Sargan Test of over identifying restrictions moreover
indicate that the instruments are not exogenous enough when we employ
Bharghava-Docquier estimates. Thus the model employed by Clemens loses its
predictive power.4.2 Sub-Saharan Africa in the World Context
Even though the emigration of physicians is a global
phenomenon severely affecting many regions other than Sub-
Saharan Africa, such as Middle East and Northern Africa or South
Asia, a simple comparison between the outflows of physicians
from each region and the stock of those left, quickly reveals that
Sub-Saharan Africa is the region where the gap between these two
variables is the lowest. This means that, in relative terms, it is the
region that is loosing the most of its workforce8. For this reason
most of the political debate on Medical Brain Drain evolves
around Sub-Saharan African countries.
In order to highlight any possible specific character of Sub-
Saharan Africa in the world context I set up a cross section
regression for 149 countries and then split this sample into two
subsamples, one for Sub-Saharan African countries and the other
for the rest of the world. I also add to my set of control variables
population density and the share of population living in urban
areas as proxies for the cost of acquiring education (the higher
population density and the share of urban population, the lower
the distance to school); moreover I introduce in the world
regression several regional dummies that allow me to isolate the
fixed regional effects on the number of physicians per 1,000
people. Finally I plug in an interaction term that multiplies the
stock of physicians abroad per 1,000 people for the Sub-Saharan
Africa dummy. This term will let us find out the peculiar effect of
Sub-Saharan Africa physicians’ migration on the domestic density.
The results of this regression are reported in Table 3, Model
1 for the panel regression and Model 2 for the cross section. These
bring to light the fact that the positive and statistically significant
relationship between the outflow and the domestic stock of
physicians is observable in Sub-Saharan Africa and there alone,
while in the world sample this relationship is reversed though
slightly significant. In other words, we find that, if a brain gain
phenomenon is to exist, then it will take place in Sub-Saharan
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TABLE 3 
MEDICAL BRAIN GAIN IN THE WORLD. OLS ESTIMATES
1991-2004 2004 2004























-0.027* 0.209*** -0.013 -0.029 0.241*** -0.007 -0.07
(1.96) (7.05) (1.02) (0.83) (2.99) (0.21) (1.5)
ln GDP/cap
0.177*** 0.546*** 0.061** 0.234*** 0.66*** 0.093 -0.019
(7.45) (10.73) (2.38) (3.79) (4.63) (1.45) (0.21)
ln Primary enrolment
0.741*** -0.042 1.382*** 0.573* -0.07 1.364***
(7.26) (0.28) (9.77) (1.87) (0.14) (3.35)
Conflict since 1970
-0.068* -0.036 -0.055 0.025 0.127 -0.03 0.009
(1.67) (0.44) (1.23) (0.22) (0.47) (0.26) (0.06)
ln population density
-0.003 0.035 0.013 -0.024 0.001 0.005 0.025
(0.21) (1.09) (0.85) (0.62) (0.01) (0.14) (0.52)
ln share of population
in urban areas
0.673*** 0.401*** 0.79*** 0.535*** 0.047 0.668*** 0.447***

















0.568*** 0.357*** 0.657*** 0.449** 0.16
(7.18) (4.61) (3.25) (2.36) (0.7)
South Asia
-0.824*** -1.12*** -0.703** -1.045*** -1.066**
(6.38) (8.52) (2.18) (3.26) (2.37)
East Asia and Pacific
-0.928*** -1.201*** -0.637** -0.99*** -1.537***





-0.569*** -0.672*** -0.476** -0.607*** -0.385
(7.84) (9.56) (2.52) (3.44) (1.52)
Latin America
and Caribbean 
-0.48*** -0.694*** -0.317 -0.585*** -0.088





Years yes yes yes
Constant
-7.113*** -6.088*** -9.588*** -6.245*** -5.353* -9.13*** -0.777
(14.02) (8.03) (13.83) (3.92) (2.00) (4.45) (0.51)
N 1,013 252 761 149 36 113 79
Adjusted R2 0.8604 0.7149 0.7001 0.8628 0.7212 0.6604 0.8789Africa as the analysis conducted up to this point seems to reveal
that only in this region the more doctors leave the country the
more there will remain, that is the emigration of physicians
triggers some mechanism of replacement of the workforce
emigrated. Understanding whether this mechanism is actually
generated by the incentives induced by the emigration of doctors
(thus confirming the hypothesis of the existence of a brain gain
phenomenon) or by other factors will be the next step in this study.
4.3 Assessing the Brain Gain: The Effects of Migration on Schooling
Decision
I consider that, in order to test the existence of a brain gain
dynamics, the domestic density of physicians is not the most
suitable dependent variable as it may depend on other factors and,
most of all, is inconsistent from a temporal perspective: an
increase in emigration can not be automatically translated into an
higher density of physicians given that training a physician
requires around seven years, so the model should at least be tested
with a seven years’ lag. Instead, I believe that a simpler way to
test it is to use as dependent variable the number of students who
choose to attend medical school the year after that in which we
register the outflow of doctors. I thus consider that educational
enrolments better represent the investment in human capital
formation than educational levels or the number of professionals9.
I run the regressions in a comparative perspective, looking at
the general and medical brain drain and at secondary and tertiary
enrolments. In order to keep the comparison between Sub-
Saharan Africa and the rest of the world I introduce an interaction
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9 This setting is consistent with that employed in FAINI R. (2003) to test the
brain gain hypothesis for secondary and tertiary education. A relevant difference,
nevertheless, is the use of the lagged dependent variable in this context. Another
important difference with the analysis conducted by Faini is that he employed
CARRINGTON W.J. - DETRAGIACHE E. data (1998), while this study is based on
DOCQUIER F. - MARFOUK A. (2005) and BHARGHAVA A. - DOCQUIER F. (2007) estimates
of emigration flows which are computed according to the country of training and
not simply to census data.term for general brain drain and one for medical brain drain; the
results are reported in Table 4, Model 1.
These seem to suggest that increased returns to higher
(tertiary) education boost the incentives to acquire lower
(secondary) education in Sub-Saharan Africa only. The fact that
this result does not hold in the case of tertiary school might
suggest that prospective migrants may want to strengthen their
chances for admission to the host country by pursuing their
graduate studies there. Hence the most talented individuals would
face an incentive to migrate after having completed secondary
school as indicated by the result on secondary enrolments. The
same reasoning holds with respect to enrolments in medical
school: the lack of any significant effect of migration on the
number of individuals enrolled in medical schools, coupled with
the positive effect on secondary enrolments, seems to suggest that
individuals would rather emigrate before attaining tertiary
education and becoming doctors. With regard to the control
variables the only relevant result we obtain is the strong positive
link between urbanization and tertiary education.10
These results, thus, suggest us to reject the hypothesis of the
existence of a brain gain; indeed we find no evidence of any kind
of positive effect of emigration on schooling decisions, neither in
the OLS nor in the 2SLS. Moreover, if a weak positive incentive
effect can exist for secondary enrolments in Sub-Saharan Africa,
this is not certainly the case neither for tertiary nor for medical
schools. We interpret this evidence as the existence of an incentive
to complete secondary school in the home country and pursue
graduate studies abroad, e.g. in the OECD country where the
individuals might desire to migrate, so as to increase the chances
of admission in that country or to attend more prestigious schools
and thus be advantaged when searching for a job.
On the one hand, these findings partially downsize the costs
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10 In order to maintain a parallel with the analysis conducted up to this point,
I also run 2SLS, whose results are not shown in this paper, following the scheme
of section 4.2. These regressions confirmed the results of the above OLS further
revealing a positive and significant (at 10% level) effect of tertiary emigration on
secondary enrolment at world-wide level.of brain drain for the sending countries as they suggest that they
do not have to pay for the tertiary education of migrants. But on
the other hand this system implies that the sending country has
to pay for the higher education of “those who are left behind”
who are very much likely to be the less talented individuals. This
means that the sending country has not only to bear the cost of
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TABLE 4
MIGRATION AND SCHOOLING DECISIONS. OLS ESTIMATES




per 1,000 people, 2001
ln enrolled in
tertiary school
per 1,000 people, 2001
ln enrolled in tertiary
school, medical studies
per 1,000 people, 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln tertiary educated
migrants/1,000 people
0.04 0.016 0.004 -0.004





ln GDP per capita
0.036 -0.044 0.155* -0.143 0.096 -0.204
(0.93) (0.67) (1.82) (0.95) (0.42) (0.99)
ln primary enrolment
0.779*** 1.289*** 2.081 -0.774
(4.27) (3.30) (1.11) (1.59)
Conflict since 1970
-0.094 -0.045 0.143 -0.199 0.234 -0.044
(1.36) (0.4) (1.02) (0.93) (0.63) (0.28)
ln population density
-0.031 -0.034 -0.087 -0.044 0.047 1.49
(1.28) (0.82) (1.55) (0.53) (0.37) (1.24)
ln share of population
in urban areas
0.082 0.5*** 0.727*** 1.338*** 1.566** 0.262















Regional Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
(SSA*ln tertiary educated
migrants/1,000)
0.194*** -0.005 0.088 -0.306






0.233 3.769*** -6.791*** 0.475 -16.037 -1.569
(0.25) (3.41) (3.31) (0.19) (1.65) (0.29)
N 141 57 105 42 53 24
Adjusted R2 0.6191 0.6495 0.7598 0.8386 0.6508 0.8796losing its best students but also to invest in the education of its
less talented and to pay for secondary education of students who
will emigrate. These mechanisms create a very inefficient system
where governments of Sub-Saharan Africa countries make very
unprofitable investments by financing either less talented
individuals or potential migrants. In the first case this creates low
returns to the investment while in the latter only a deadweight
loss (unless the migrant later returns to his home country).
It is finally to be underlined that it is often the sending
country that finances the education of its students abroad through
public grants and scholarships, this creates an additional cost for
Sub-Saharan countries and again there will be no returns to these
investments if the migrant does not ever return.
4.4 Impact of Medical Brain Drain on Health Status
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the debate on
development issues is today focused on the achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although migration and
brain drain do not appear among the priorities on the
international agenda, still, there is a very tight link between these
issues and (at least) the three health-related MDGs11.
The availability and preparation of health personnel plays a
primary role in the pursuit of these goals determining the coverage
rate of both basic and more complex health care services. There
is, indeed, ample evidence that workers’ availability is linked to
infant and maternal survival rates as well as with HIV/AIDS
mortality. The data in Graphs 3 and 4 show these relationships: I
employed Bharghava-Docquier data on physicians’ density and
associated them with the main health indicators derived from
WHO (2006a) databases for the whole world. The indicators I
chose measure both mortality rates (Graph 3) and health care
provision (Graph 4).
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11 These are: to Reduce Child Mortality (MDG 4), to Improve Maternal Health
(MDG 5) and to Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (MDG 6).RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
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GRAPH 3
HEALTH WORKERS’ DENSITY AND MORTALITY RATES.
FULL SAMPLE. YEAR 2004
Source: WHO (2006a) and BHARGHAVA A. - DOCQUIER F. (2006).The Impact of Skilled Migration on the Sending Country: etc. L. RIZZICA
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GRAPH 4
HEALTH WORKERS’ DENSITY AND HEALTH
SERVICE COVERAGE. FULL SAMPLE. YEAR 2004
Source: WHO (2006a) and BHARGHAVA A. - DOCQUIER F. (2006).In order to test the magnitude and significance of the effects
of physicians’ availability and medical brain drain on the health
status of the population in the sending country I regressed the
logarithm of the three mortality12 indicators on the stock of health
staff available and on the number of emigrated physicians abroad
(both per 1,000 people) using the usual set of controls: GDP per
capita, primary enrolment rate, conflict since 1970, population
density and share of population living in urban areas (Table 5).
As we could predict I find a strong and negative effect of
physicians’ availability on infant, maternal and HIV/AIDS
mortality rates: the more doctors in the country, the lower the
rates of mortality. Other variables that turn out to play a
significant role in lowering the rates of mortality are the level of
per capita GDP and the level of urbanization. Also it impresses
how the incidence of an armed conflict strongly increases infant
mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover the results of Table 5 show that the emigration of
doctors dramatically boosts the number of deaths due to
HIV/AIDS and that this effect is much stronger for Sub-Saharan
Africa than for the rest of the world.
What is somehow puzzling, instead, is the fact that these
results seem to reveal that the emigration of physicians negatively
influences the rates of infant and maternal mortality and positively
the rate of coverage of health services13. What I suggest is that
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12 Similar regressions have been run employing indicators of health assistance
coverage: rate of measles immunization of children aged one, rate of births
attended by skilled personnel, rate of HIV affected receiving antiretroviral (ARV)
therapy. For all the three indicators I found a positive incidence of medical staff
availability on the services’ coverage rates (though this is not significant in the
case of ARV therapy). In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, nevertheless, it is
systematically either the population density variable or the share of urban
population one that capture the positive effect on the rate of coverage of health
care rather than the stock of health workers itself (this is because among very
poor countries such as those of Sub-Saharan Africa it is more the level of
development of the country rather than the number of doctors available which
determine the rate of coverage of health care. In other words those countries which
are relatively better off present higher rates of coverage of health services no matter
the availability of doctors).
13 The results relative to the provision of health care services are not reported
in the present work for brevity. The services considered are: rate of measlesthese results are due to the fact that the skilled emigration variable
may hide some characteristics of the country of origin related to
its level of human development. This idea would be confirmed by
the high level of significance of the variables “per capita GDP” and
“share of population living in urban areas” which are proxies for
the level of economic and human development of the country.
4.5 Quality of Education and Brain Drain
The link between the level of human development of a country,
its rate of brain drain and its outcomes in terms of health status
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immunization of children aged one, rate of births attended by skilled personnel,
rate of HIV affected receiving ARV therapy.
TABLE 5
MIGRATION AND HEALTH OUTCOMES. OLS ESTIMATES (2004)








































































































































ln total stock of
medical staff
per 1,000 people
-0.254*** -0.004 -0.226*** -0.739*** 0.04 -0.719*** -0.566*** -0.308 -0.161
(4.30) (0.04) (3.39) (8.17) (0.21) (6.50) (2.72) (0.42) (0.76)
ln physicians
abroad/1,000 people
-0.045* -0.038 -0.047* -0.036 -0.123* -0.019 0.236** 0.546** 0.239**
(1.87) (0.86) (1.81) (0.79) (1.77) (0.36) (2.36) (2.14) (2.40)
ln GDP per capita
-0.447*** -0.354*** -0.432*** -0.444*** -0.67*** -0.425*** -0.229 -0.359 -0.221
(9.80) (3.68) (9.04) (6.07) (4.15) (5.18) (1.38) (0.64) (1.42)
ln Primary
enrolment
0.022 0.275 -0.217 0.539 0.527 0.619 -1.036 0.868 -1.331
(0.1) (1.09) (0.68) (1.53) (1.36) (1.16) (1.33) (0.68) (1.32)
Conflict since 1970
0.038 0.284* 0.072 0.049 0.225 0.109 -0.732** -0.267 -0.44
(0.42) (2.01) (0.73) (0.34) (1) (0.65) (2.14) (0.33) (1.29)
ln population
density
0.101 0.181 0.016 0.151 0.157 0.167 -0.468 -0.818 -0.096
(0.91) (1.14) (0.13) (0.84) (0.62) (0.77) (1.17) (0.96) (0.24)
ln population
in urban areas
-0.085*** -0.171*** -0.044 -0.123** -0.191** -0.067 -0.251** -0.552** -0.096
(2.84) (3.74) (1.35) (2.57) (2.63) (1.17) (2.36) (2.25) (0.91)
Constant
6.516*** 4.91*** 7.546*** 1.52 3.017 0.607 14.753*** 11.399 12.857**
(5.44) (3.26) (4.57) (0.79) (1.3) (0.21) (3.48) (1.48) (2.40)
N 146 36 110 138 34 104 122 33 89
Adjusted R2 0.8417 0.6729 0.8065 0.8287 0.6926 0.7474 0.2741 0.0612 0.0524of the population may pass through the differences in terms of
quality of the educational system and levels of educational
attainment in the country.
What I suggest is that the positive impact of emigration onto
the health status of the sending country’s population may indicate
that the emigration variable absorbs part of the effect of
unobserved quality differences in educational systems. In other
words, it is likely that professionals who have been trained in a
high quality educational system have a higher probability of being
hired in developed countries. Thus a high number of physicians
trained in their country of origin and currently working in OECD
countries may reflect a high quality of education in that specific
sending country. This may rationalise the finding that a greater
number of physicians abroad is negatively correlated with
mortality rates and positively correlated with the rate of health
services’ coverage.
To get indirect evidence on this conjecture, I introduce several
more regressors to proxy for the country’s level of human
development and the quality of its educational system. Thus, I
include Barro and Lee (2000) measures of educational attainment
for population aged 25 and over14 and the ratios of pupils to
teacher at primary and secondary school (Barro and Lee, 2001)
to control for the quality of the educational system of the sending
country.
Indeed I believe that traditional education indicators such as
school enrolment ratios or literacy rates do not adequately
measure the aggregate stock of human capital of which the
country disposes at a certain point in time as an input for
production. Together with these indicators, pupils/teacher ratios
let us control for the quality of the educational system. Indeed,
Barro and Lee (2001) provided evidence that more school
resources, especially smaller class sizes, are the main determinants
of educational quality, as measured by internationally comparable
test scores, repetition rates and dropout rates.
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14 These are “Percentage of primary school complete in the total population”
and “Percentage of secondary school complete in the total population”.I will thus reproduce the estimations of the effect of migration
onto the stock of physicians in the sending country, the number
of students enrolled to secondary, tertiary and medical school and
the main health outcomes, introducing this new set of controls
(Table 3, Model 3; Table 4, Model 2; Table 6).
These results seem to confirm the hypothesis on the spurious
character of the emigration variable; indeed, in Table 3, Model 3,
when computing the OLS estimates of the determinants of the
stock of physicians operating in their country of origin, I find that
the level of educational attainment has a highly significant and
positive (for both primary and secondary school) effect, while the
number of pupils per teacher at primary school is negatively (and
significantly) correlated with the dependent variable. Further more
the coefficient associated to the interaction term which in Model
1 and Model 2 suggested the existence of some medical brain gain
for Sub-Saharan Africa becomes now much smaller and less
significant.
In Table 4, Model 2, I look at the effects on enrolment rates
adding the new set of controls. The brain gain effect I had found
for the rates of enrolment to secondary school for Sub-Saharan
Africa now completely disappears, all the effect being captured by
the quality of the educational system. On the other hand, adding
the new control variables, no brain gain effect is revealed either
at tertiary level or for medical studies, as had been suggested in
section 4.3.
Finally in Table 6, I analyzed the effects of physicians’
emigration on the health status of the sending country’s
population, introducing the variables for the quality of education
and the level of school attainment. The results seem to confirm
the idea that the brain drain variable actually hides some
characteristics linked to the level of human development of the
sending country and to the quality of its educational system in
particular. Indeed, not only has now the negative relationship
between emigration and mortality rates of Table 5 disappeared,
but, in the case of deaths due to HIV/AIDS, the positive coefficient
I had found in Table 5 has become greater and still highly
significant. This means that, once the educational variables have
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln total stock of medical
staff per 1,000 people
-0.048 0.004 -0.179 0.063 -0.437 -0.313
(0.43) (0.03) (1.01) (0.24) (1.1) (0.55)
ln physicians abroad/
1,000 people
-0.001 -0.07 -0.007 -0.083 0.737*** 0.608***
(0.02) (1.32) (0.1) (0.92) (4.97) (3.82)
Controlsii yes yes yes yes yes yes
ln primary attainment
-0.205** 0.018 0.012 0.175 -1.343*** -0.203
(2.04) (0.13) (0.07) (0.79) (3.43) (0.37)
ln secondary attainment
-0.07 -0.015 -0.192 -0.144 -0.146 -0.256
(0.86) -0.11 (1.29) (0.66) (0.46) (0.62)
ln pupil-teacher
ratio at primary
0.699** 0.492 1.063** 0.873 0.954 0.708
(2.46) (1.47) (2.19) (1.6) (0.93) (0.67)
ln pupil-teacher
ratio at secondary
-0.057 -0.158 -0.029 0.006 -1.499 -1.118






4.979*** 5.566*** 0.78 1.193 17.423*** 10.431*
(3.80) (3.36) (0.35) (0.46) (3.55) (1.90)
N 78 48 72 46 66 44
Adjusted R2 0.8547 0.8877 0.825 0.8691 0.3978 0.3829




AND QUALITY OF EDUCATION. OLS ESTIMATES
been introduced, the emigration of physicians determines a
substantial increase in the number of deaths due to HIV/AIDS15.
The introduction of the interaction terms for Sub-Saharan Africa
in Columns 2, 4 and 6 reveals that there is no difference between
the effects of brain drain for Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of
the world.
In conclusion, these results confirm the hypothesis that the
apparent virtuous effects of brain drain on education (i.e. brain
gain) and on health actually hide some characteristics relative to
15 I tested the effect of MBD on the rate of provision of the health services
indicated in footnote 13 adding the variables on the quality of education and on
educational attainment. With regard to the provision of these services again the
emigration variable turns out to be not significant once I control for the quality
of education. Indeed the level of educational attainment is always significant and
positively related to the rate of coverage of health services.the quality of the educational system of the sending country. The
introduction of Barro and Lee indicators has let us see the “pure”
effect of emigration on educational choices and health outcomes.
By the way, once we reject the hypothesis that the emigration
of physicians may be beneficial for the sending country, still its
effect has not been completely clarified by this analysis as its
coefficients have almost systematically remained not significant.
With regard to the health status of the sending country’s
population the analysis has suggested that the outflows of
physicians towards the most developed countries have no impact,
neither positive nor negative, on mortality rates and on the levels
of provision of health services (except for the strong positive effect
on HIV/AIDS mortality). In order to test this finding I eventually
turned to a case study to shed light on the effects of physicians’
emigration that have not been captured by the econometric
analysis.
5. - Case Study: Lessons from Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is one of the countries most severely hit by the
medical brain drain phenomenon. Despite the presence of a very
competitive medical school at the University of Zimbabwe which
trains every year around 80-90 doctors, the massive emigration of
its graduates does not allow the country to benefit from its
investment in the training of prospective doctors.
Indeed data obtained from the Zimbabwean Central Statistical
Office (CSO) and reported by Chikanda (2005) show that the
number of registered doctors and specialists in the country has
increased slightly from 1,575 in 1995 to 1,629 in 2000 (3%
increase). Given the number of doctors trained every year at the
Medical School of the University of Zimbabwe, this means that
there was an overall increase of only 54 doctors rather than the
expected 400 plus over the five-year period. The data employed in
this study reveal that emigration is the main responsible for such
a discrepancy.
The massive phenomenon of medical brain drain from
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with CSO data reporting that the country is currently experiencing
a decline in its domestic stock of nurses started in the late 1990s
(in 1999 there were 15,476 registered nurses while in 2001 there
remained only 12,477 as the result of a growing emigration).
The outflow of medical staff from Zimbabwe also represents
a significant fiscal loss for the country, which not only loses its
best professionals but also bears the cost of their formation. The
International Organization for Migration (2007) reports that the
cost of training a doctor, for a government, is about $60,000 and
that of training a nurse about $15,000. This means that if
Zimbabwe has trained 450 doctors between 1995 and 2000, and
400 of them have left the country, the government has lost an
amount of around $24 million for doctors and around $45 million
for the 3,000 nurses lost between 1999 and 2001. These costs are
to be added to those the country faces in order to replace the
health workers emigrated recruiting health personnel from
abroad. In the case of Zimbabwe the government is facing its
shortage of physicians through the stipulation of agreements with
other countries: Zimbabwe has an agreement with Cuba which
brought to the country 117 doctors in 2002 and one with the
Democratic Republic of Congo which brought to Harare 54
doctors, 11 pharmacists and three radiographers in 2003. Such
agreements are, nevertheless, extremely expensive for Zimbabwe
as the government not only has to pay their salaries and travel
expenses but also has to bear the costs of teaching English and
Shona to them. Moreover, as these staffs are recruited only on a
temporary basis these costs are to be borne periodically16.
The effect of these outflows on the health status of the
population and on the provision of health cares is hardly
identifiable through the analysis of the estimates provided by
WHO. Indeed, in spite of a dramatic shortage of physicians (there
are currently 5.7 physicians per 100,000 people) and of a
substantial emigration of doctors (according to Bharghava-
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16 For instance, in the case of the agreement with DRC the doctors were
foreseen to stay in Zimbabwe for three years.Docquier estimates 3.3 physicians per 100,000 people have been
trained in Zimbabwe and currently work in OECD countries), the
country exhibits a rate of one year old children immunization and
of births attended by skilled personnel of 80%. Thus it seems that,
despite its shortage of health personnel, Zimbabwe currently
manages to assure its population a sufficient level of basic health
cares.
Surveys conducted among the health personnel of Zimbabwe
in the context of the Southern Africa Migration Project (Chikanda,
2005 and Tevera, 2005) reveal, in fact, that the real gap is not just
in terms of “quantity” of services provided but much more in
terms of their “quality”.
Indeed medical brain drain affects the quality of health care
via two channels: on the one hand the “best” workers are the first
ones to leave the country, which hence remains with the less
qualified ones, on the other hand the shortage of health workers
caused by migration heavily increases the workload of those who
remain and forces them to offer services they are neither supposed
nor qualified to render. In many health centres the so-called “nurse
aides” have to carry out nursing responsibilities, while nurses
perform doctors’ duties. The survey conducted by Chikanda (2005)
revealed that, among the respondents, 66% of the doctors and 55%
of the nurses claimed they sometimes had to offer services they
are not supposed to render, but do so because of the absence of
specialised personnel.
Moreover nurses and doctors can spend a very short time on
each single patient, interviews with health professionals revealing
that more than half of them (55%) took less than ten minutes to
attend a single patient. This unavoidably hurries the diagnoses
and prescriptions of treatments with obvious consequences in
terms of accuracy. The excessive workload, associated with the
stress of dealing with so many dying patients and the fear of HIV
contagion due to inadequate hygienic conditions, generates a
widespread sense of frustration on the job which affects the
quality of care and induces these health workers to opt to emigrate
making the phenomenon of medical brain drain a vicious circle.
In conclusion, medical brain drain and the consequent
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services provided than their “quantity”. It is worth highlighting
that this result holds as long as we look at the provision of basic
health care, indeed when we consider some more complex
therapies such as ARV for HIV/AIDS affected people, the rate of
people with advanced HIV infection receiving ARV combination
therapy in Zimbabwe falls to 15% (WHO, 2006a) and the empirical
results reported in Tables 5 and 6 confirm that the emigration of
physicians generates an increase in the rates of HIV/AIDS
mortality.
6. - Concluding Remarks
In conclusion this research revealed that, in the health sector,
there is no evidence of any kind of brain gain phenomenon as I
did not find any significant variation neither in the number of
physicians in the country nor in the number of individuals who
choose to enrol in medical school in response to the outflows of
physicians towards more developed countries. The results obtained
by Clemens (2007) are thus considerably weakened once we just
employ a different and more restrictive definition of “African
doctor” and focus the analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa only.
Moreover I found that, in Africa, and there alone, high rates
of emigration are associated with high densities of physicians in
the home country and low levels of mortality rates. I suggested
that this correlation may be spurious, as the emigration variable
may proxy for the quality of the educational system of the country,
and thus of its level of “human development”: a higher level of
human development would imply both higher rates of brain drain
and lower mortality rates. Indeed when controlling for the level
of human development, the level of the population’s educational
attainment and the quality of the educational system, this effect
disappears.
The empirical analysis moreover revealed that the availability
of medical staff has no impact on the amount of health services
provided and on mortality rates. The case study of section 5,
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physicians’ emigration on the home country’s health system: the
experience of Zimbabwe, showed that the most important effect
of emigration is not on the “quantity” of services provided but
rather on their “quality” and on the working conditions of those
left: staff that received a good professional formation manages to
provide the population with basic health care but is less effective
in more complex therapies because the emigration of doctors and
nurses generates enormous workload for those who remain. It is
for this reason that physicians’ emigration turned out to have a
positive significant effect on the number of deaths due to
HIV/AIDS, as I suggested, this might be due to the more complex
nature of the therapy required, which cannot be administered by
less skilled personnel.
All these results, by the way, should be taken with caution
because of the small size of the sample due to the scarce
availability of data for Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular I believe
that educational choices should be analyzed in a more
comprehensive setup where private returns to education are
considered both in the home country and in potential destination
countries. Unfortunately data on doctors’ wages in Sub-Saharan
Africa are rarely available and extremely variable both across and
within countries. Another key aspect is certainly the quality of
medical structures which in Sub-Saharan Africa is often very poor
and thus often triggers “escape strategies” for doctors and nurses.
Also it must be taken into account that the medical profession is
particularly problematic because it entails a strong vocational
component. Hence I believe that collecting data at individual level
would probably be a useful exercise for better understanding the
mechanisms behind individuals’ educational choices and the
relationship between these and migration prospects.
For the moment what this study showed was that no evidence
of any kind of brain gain phenomenon can be found for Sub-
Saharan Africa and that medical brain drain entails some negative
externalities on the home country’s population which is the reason
why this phenomenon currently raises major concern among
policy makers and international organizations.
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